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California Climate Law -- Model or Object 
Lesson? 
DANIEL A. FARBER* 
 
In the invitation to this Symposium on Reconceptualizing the 
Future of Environmental Law, the organizers explained that the 
Symposium “focuses on the continued expansion of environmental 
law into distinct areas of the law, requiring an increasingly 
multidisciplinary approach beyond that of traditional federal 
regulation.”1  In short, the question posed is about the future 
proliferation of environmental measures outside the previous 
domains of federal environmental statutes. 
At the risk of being guilty of local parochialism, I would like 
to discuss how the future described by the organizers has already 
arrived in California—both in the sense that a great deal is 
happening outside the purview of “federal statutes,” and that 
much of it involves “distinct areas of law” other than traditional 
environmental regulation. My focus will be on the issue of climate 
change, where California has been particularly active. 
Not all of California’s efforts have been met with approval, 
even from observers who are highly sympathetic to the goals. 
Some influential environmental scholars have debated whether 
California might have done better to simply set a price on carbon 
and avoid further regulatory apparatus, either by traditional 
 
* Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. This essay 
was written for the Pace Environmental Law Review’s March 2015 Symposium, 
Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law, held on March 20, 2015. 
 1. Symposium on Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law, PACE 
LAW, http://www.law.pace.edu/symposium-reconceptualizing-future-environ 
mental-law (last visited Mar. 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/3F24-6NKS. 
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regulators or elsewhere. I will use this debate to discuss some of 
the costs and benefits of mainstreaming environmental law into 
areas outside of the traditional environmental statutes. 
Part I will address California’s broad portfolio of climate 
measures. These measures certainly fit the organizer’s 
description: none of them are federal, but many are implemented 
by parts of the state government other than environmental 
agencies, and some reach forms of conduct well outside 
traditional environmental regulation. Part II will ask whether 
the breadth of this regulatory portfolio is really desirable: would 
we be better off to stick to a simple direct attack on carbon 
emissions? Using so many different tools may simply be an 
unnecessary complication, if not counterproductive. But a broad 
portfolio might also be more effective in some ways. 
I. CALIFORNIA’S MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 
In California, efforts focusing specifically on climate change 
can be traced back to 1988, when a law required the first 
inventory of in-state greenhouse gas emissions.2  Since then, 
California has continued to pursue a wide range of policies to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2006, Governor 
Schwarzenegger signed into law the capstone of the State’s 
climate policy, the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006, or Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32).3 
AB 32 sets a binding greenhouse gas emissions target, 
requiring California to reduce emissions to the 1990 level by 
2020, and to make deeper reductions by 2050.4  This law 
generated world-wide attention, including a statement by the 
British Prime Minister that its signing represented a “historic 
day for the rest of the world as well.”5  The Prime Minister and 
 
 2. 1988 Cal. Stat. ch. 1506. 
 3. 2006 Cal. Stat. 89 (codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500-99 
(West 2010)) [hereinafter Assembly Bill 32]. 
 4. Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the 
Constitution, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10653, 10653 (2007). 
 5. Id. at 10654 (citations omitted). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/7
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the Governor of California also entered into an agreement to 
share best practices on market-based systems and to cooperate to 
investigate new technologies; similar agreements now exist 
between California and states and provinces in Australia and 
Canada.6  In the November 2010 elections, a ballot initiative to 
suspend indefinitely the operation of AB 32 was soundly defeated, 
with sixty-one percent of Californians voting to keep AB 32 in 
effect.7  The vote showed that there is significant grassroots 
support for climate change legislation, at least in California. 
In implementing AB 32, the California State Air Resources 
Board quickly developed nine “discrete early action greenhouse 
gas emission reduction measures”8 designed to go into effect 
before the trading system is implemented. Four of these actions 
focus on reducing emissions of high global warming potential 
(GWP) gases, which are gases whose impact on the climate is 
hundreds or thousands of times greater than that of carbon 
dioxide. The most significant of the early action items, however, 
was establishing a low-carbon fuel standard, per Executive Order 
S-01-07,9 to reduce the greenhouse gas intensity of transportation 
fuels by ten percent by 2020.10  The low carbon fuel standard 
(LCFS) also allows suppliers to generate credits for exceeding the 
reduction required for that year, creating the opportunity for a 
trading market in credits among suppliers.11 
Other early-action items provide some indication of how 
California has gone beyond the traditional approach in which an 
environmental agency imposes restrictions on a large industrial 
source. Some of the most notable early-action items include 
 
 6. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 10659. 
 7. Margot Roosevelt, Prop. 23 Battle Marks New Era in Environmental 
Politics, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/04/local/ 
la-me-global-warming-20101104, archived at http://perma.cc/7VAL-CTX6. 
 8. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560.5(a)-(b) (West 2010). 
 9. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-01-07 (Jan. 18, 2007),http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9GB2-R2T3. 
 10. INST. OF TRANSP. STUDIES, UNIV. OF CAL., DAVIS, A LOW-CARBON FUEL 
STANDARD FOR CALIFORNIA, PART 2: POLICY ANALYSIS 2 (2007), available at 
pubs.its.ucdavis.edu/download_pdf.php?id=1084, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
6LBB-A5B3. 
 11. Id. at 53-54. 
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increasing the capture of methane from landfills,12 creating a tire 
pressure program that allows owners of vehicles to properly 
maintain their tire pressure,13 and reducing diesel emissions 
from ports by providing electricity to berthed ships.14 
Even more notable than these early action items, of course, is 
the later establishment of California’s cap-and-trade program, 
which sets a declining, statewide cap on greenhouse gas 
emissions15 and covers about six hundred industrial facilities.16 
But, AB 32 is much more than the trading system supervised by 
the California Air Resources Board. Indeed, a government list of 
agencies implementing AB 32 includes the Business, Consumer 
Services and Housing Agency, the California Department of 
Public Health, the Office of Emergency Services, the California 
Transportation Agency, the California Energy Commission, the 
California Department of Food and Agriculture, and the 
California Public Utilities Commission.17 
The California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) has been 
particularly active. The CPUC has had an extensive energy 
efficiency program since the 1970s.18  The CPUC also has a very 
 
 12. Landfill Methane Control Measure, CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/landfills/landfills.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/R53C-QJ69. 
 13. Tire Inflation Regulation, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/tire-
pressure/tire-pressure.htm (last updated Dec. 16, 2010), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9ZE7-D7MB. 
 14. Shore Power for Ocean-Going Vessels, CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/ports/shorepower/shorepower.htm (last updated Mar. 17, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/FD7X-S6HX. 
 15. See generally ARB Emissions Trading Program Overview, CAL. AIR RES. 
BD., available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2010/capandtrade.pdf (last 
updated Oct. 27, 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/7PTG-Q8NY. 
 16. Overview of ARB Emissions Trading Program, CAL. AIR RES. BD., 
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/2011/cap_trade_overview.pdf (last 
updated Oct. 20, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/44B9-ESHQ. 
 17. Assembly Bill 32 Overview, CAL. AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca. 
gov/cc/ab32/ab32.htm (last updated Aug. 5, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/D5MS-YVLZ. 
 18. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CA ENERGY EFFICIENCY STRATEGIC PLAN: 
JANUARY 2011 UPDATE 1 (2011), available at http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
NR/rdonlyres/A54B59C2-D571-440D-9477-3363726F573A/0/CAEnergyEfficiency 
StrategicPlan_Jan2011.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/P3NF-32QT (The CPUC 
has adopted an ambitious strategic plan on energy efficiency based on a 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/7
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ambitious Renewables Portfolio Standard, under a series of three 
State laws, resulting in about a twenty-three percent use of 
renewables by the State’s largest private utilities.19  The 2020 
target established by the legislature is thirty-three percent.20 
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) also 
mandates consideration of climate change.21  Like federal law, 
CEQA mandates preparation of environmental assessments; but 
unlike federal law, it also imposes a duty to mitigate 
environmental impacts.22  Given that the statute applies not only 
to state government, but also to local government, the result is to 
embed environmental considerations into a wide range of 
government actions, such as urban planning. 
This is only a superficial look at California’s efforts, but it is 
enough to make two points.  First, in terms of whether 
environmental law has moved beyond federal statutes (or state 
actions under the aegis of federal law), the answer is obviously 
yes.  California has been a very active player in climate change 
and began well before any significant federal involvement.  
Second, California has moved well beyond the classic regulations 
of emitters that are the traditional staple of environmental law.  
Rather, California has unleashed a barrage of different measures 
involving many different aspects of life and many different kinds 
 
recognition that “California’s very ambitious energy efficiency and greenhouse 
gas reduction goals require long-term strategic planning to eliminate persistent 
market barriers and effect lasting transformation in the market for energy 
efficiency across the economy.”). 
 19. California Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS), CAL. PUB. UTILS. 
COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/Renewables/ (last visited Feb. 26, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/NFK6-WD52. 
 20. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD QUARTERLY 
REPORT, 3RD QUARTER 2014 (2014), available athttp://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
NR/rdonlyres/CA15A2A8-234D-4FB4-BE4105409E8F6316/0/2014Q3RPSReport 
Final.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BV6R-CSW3. 
 21. See CEQA and Climate Change, GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF PLANNING & RES., 
http://opr.ca.gov/s_ceqaandclimatechange.php (last visited Feb. 26, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/6YC2-WHSW. 
 22. See, e.g., City of Marina v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 138 P.3d 692, 
696 (Cal. 2006); Woodward Park Homeowners Ass’n v. City of Fresno, 58 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 102, 132 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007). 
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of government agencies, covering everything from tire inflation by 
automobile owners to land use planning and utility regulation. 
Thus, the expansion of environmental law beyond the 
traditional borders of federal environmental regulation is already 
well underway in California.  Still, one might ask, is that 
expansion a good idea?  Or does the future lie elsewhere? 
II. SHOULD WE CUT THE GORDIAN KNOT? 
Perhaps the Californian approach is too complicated and 
overworked.  Ann Carlson explored the case for a simpler, more 
direct approach in a 2012 article.23  Her basic thesis is simply 
put: 
If the government enacts a cap-and-trade scheme—but 
independently regulates through complementary policies a 
significant percentage of the emissions that would otherwise be 
subject to cap-and-trade—the opportunities for reductions of 
emissions covered by cap-and-trade will be reduced. Moreover the 
emissions reductions occurring because of complementary 
policies may be more expensive than reductions a cap-and-trade 
scheme would produce independently—the point of cap-and-trade 
is to find the cheapest cost reductions, and those may be different 
reductions than the ones required by complementary policies.24 
 
It would be an oversimplification to say Carlson is merely 
opposed to complementary measures. She suggests that 
renewable portfolio standards are unlikely to be desirable unless 
the cap-and-trade program is defective.25 But she sees more 
promise in energy efficiency programs given the evidence that 
consumers fail to make rational choices in that sphere.26 
A stronger version of the Carlson thesis—stronger than 
Carlson herself would endorse—would simply be that if we get 
 
 23. See Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade 
and Complementary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (2012). 
 24. Id. at 210. 
 25. Id. at 231-40. 
 26. Id. at 240-48. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/7
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prices right, everything else will take care of itself. There is no 
need to worry about dictating energy sources to utilities or 
consumers, fostering public transportation, or making the urban 
footprint less sprawling. Price signals will reverberate through 
the economic system, making renewable energy and energy 
efficiency more appealing, giving people an incentive to live in 
more centrally located housing in order to cut commuting costs, 
and making public transit a more attractive option compared 
with cars. 
Two other California environmental scholars, Holly Doremus 
and Michael Hanemann, take a rather different view.27  Although 
they view cap-and-trade as a useful tool, they argue that much 
more must be done. In their opinion, appliance efficiency 
measures, building codes, and land use planning decisions are 
also needed, because price signals are too attenuated to change 
individual behavior, and because at least some of the necessary 
changes require collective decisions.28  For instance, they explain: 
Home builders and buyers are responsible at some level for the 
global-warming effects of home design and subdivision layout, 
but buyers may have few choices; and builders are unlikely to be 
large direct emitters, may be constrained by local zoning, and 
may not be around long enough for the outcomes of their 
decisions to become apparent. 
   
Still other emissions are poor candidates for trading because the 
accounting is difficult. For example, agricultural practices other 
than fuel consumption are responsible for about 6% of U.S. GHG 
emissions. . . . Since these activities occur in the open air and do 
not involve fuel inputs which can be used as convenient proxies, 
their emissions cannot be monitored with the precision required 
for optimal trading markets.29 
 
 27. Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why 
the Clean Air Act's Cooperative Federalism Framework Is Useful for Addressing 
Global Warming, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 799 (2008). 
 28. Doremus & Hanemann, supra note 27, at 816. 
 29. Id. 
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The difference between these two viewpoints should not be 
exaggerated: both sides believe that cap-and-trade is an 
important part of climate policy, but neither thinks it is entirely 
sufficient. They also seem to agree that it is not enough to simply 
impose numerical limits on carbon emissions by industry. But the 
emphases are quite different. 
The argument for relying on price signals is simple. Market 
economies work by using price signals to coordinate behavior 
across space, time, and multiple actors, rather than attempting to 
use legal directives to make the market work. The more we see 
climate change as a multidimensional problem, the more 
appealing it becomes to use a simple price signal to deal with all 
the dimensions at once. 
The scholars discussed above would all agree on the 
usefulness of these price signals, but their work points to several 
limitations on their effectiveness. First, we might not get the 
price right, either because it is deliberately set below the 
optimum level for political reasons or because of defects in the 
trading system. Second, some kinds of sources may be too difficult 
to monitor for inclusion in the system. Third, there could be 
collective action problems in the response of individuals or 
communities to price changes. Fourth, human beings are fallible 
and may not respond with perfect rationality to price signals. The 
last three objections are not unrelated to the price level: a high 
enough price may create enough motivation to find ways to 
reduce emissions despite the obstacles. But the price may not be 
high enough to have this effect. 
The difficulty of being sure of the scope of these exceptions 
argues for flexibility and local experimentation. Some of 
California’s emphasis on complementary measures may well have 
been due to doubts about how well an as-yet-untested trading 
system would work. If the system works out well, the need for 
some of the complementary measures may diminish. On the other 
hand, experience may also show that even more vigorous 
complementary measures are needed because trading systems 
simply have too little impact on individual behavior—or for that 
matter, on organizational behavior. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/7
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To quickly sum up, this Symposium is about a vision of the 
future of environmental law, one where environmental law has 
overflowed the banks of the traditional EPA regulation. We saw 
in Part I that this version of the future is already in full force in 
California, as indicated by the multidimensional measures, 
involving many different parts of government, undertaken to 
address climate change. In Part II, we considered whether 
market instruments might provide a much simpler approach to 
addressing climate change and, by implication, other 
environmental problems.  It seems clear that market instruments 
are not sufficient by themselves, but it is less clear just how much 
supplementation is required. The efforts of California and other 
jurisdictions should provide useful information about the right 
balance between market instruments and complementary 
measures. But we will not know the answer for some time. 
The title to this short essay asks whether, in terms of the 
issues involved in this symposium, California should be 
considered a model for the future or an object lesson to be 
avoided. The answer, no doubt, will turn out to be “both.” That is 
the nature of all efforts to tackle intractable problems: they get 
some things right the first time, but not others. 
 
9
